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HIS Article covers cases from 289 S.W.3d through 314 S.W.3d,
and federal cases during the same time period, which the authors
believe are noteworthy additions to the jurisprudence on the ap-
plicable subject.
I. INTRODUCTION
There were no substantive changes in real property law in the areas of
debtor/creditor relationships, guaranties, leases and landlord/tenant rela-
tionships, or in the more traditional areas relating to conveyances, other
title matters and related miscellaneous property rights. But, there were a
few cases which deserve mention for various reasons. In particular, there
are significant decisions involving assignment of rents, rights of first re-
fusal and correction deeds.
II. MORTGAGES, LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
A. USE OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Keith's home mortgage had a casualty provision providing that "[Mort-
gagee] may apply any proceeds received under the insurance policy either
to reduce the note or to repair or replace damaged or destroyed improve-
ments covered by the policy."' The outstanding balance on the mortgage
debt was $22,600, but the casualty caused $25,000 in damages. An insur-
ance company check, payable to Keith, her attorney, and Statewide was
sent by Keith's attorney to Statewide, requesting endorsement and return
to pay repair expenses. After two weeks without a response, Keith's at-
torney demanded the return of the insurance check. Statewide failed to
return the check, and Keith filed suit. Thereafter, the mortgagee re-
quested a listing of contractors, invoices and contracts for the repair
work. During discovery, Keith produced invoices for the repairs for
$14,400, and was paid by Statewide. At trial, Statewide contended that it
acted reasonably in its request for invoices and contracts to assure that
the proceeds were spent on repair. Keith argued that the deed of trust
did not require the mortgagor to provide invoices or contracts for the
repair and that Statewide made no election on the use of such insurance
proceeds before the suit.
The issue addressed was whether a mortgagee can decide, after the
mortgagor repaired the property, to apply the insurance proceeds against
the loan instead of repair costs. The Court noted that the relative
amounts of the insurance proceeds and the balance of the loan were such
that Statewide, acting prudently, would have been on notice of the exten-
sive damages to the home, raising a duty on Statewide to make an elec-
tion within a fairly short period of time. A letter from the mortgagee
indicating that repair costs would be paid upon delivery of invoices was
1. Statewide Bank & SN Servicing Corp. v. Keith, 301 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2009, pet. abated) (quoting deed of trust).
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determined to be ambiguous and was insufficient to act as an exercise of
the mortgagee's option. A subsequent letter conditioning disbursement
of proceeds on a property inspection was further evidence that a formal
election had not been unequivocally made. Also, the Texas Insurance
Code, 2 which covers the mortgagee's handling of insurance proceeds, re-
quires prompt notice to the homeowner of each requirement for the re-
lease of insurance proceeds. A mortgagee has ten days after receipt of
the required information in which to release such insurance funds or to
specifically explain the reasons for the refusal and the requirements
needed for a release.3
Since Statewide's first contact was seven weeks after its receipt of the
insurance proceeds, and its first payment of repair invoices was seven
months after its receipt of the proceeds, this amounted to a failure to
timely elect its option. This case is noteworthy for its advice to practition-
ers. First, the one ambiguous sentence regarding application of insurance
proceeds is in stark contrast to typical commercial deed of trust provi-
sions which detail the manner and timing of such election. Clarity and
detail are the watchwords. Secondly, this case provides guidance for re-
sponses to casualty events. Important factors for reasonable response
time include the contractual provisions, the extent of damage, partial
funding of insurance proceeds, and applicable statutory provisions.
B. SUBROGATION
The doctrine of subrogation is addressed in Chase Home Finance,
L.L.C. v. Cal Western Reconveyance Corporation.4 Dickerson financed
the acquisition of a lot with two notes and deeds of trust: a $300,000 first
lien deed of trust (Dickerson I) and a $75,000 second lien deed of trust
(Dickerson II). Dickerson sold the property to Gooch without discharg-
ing the Dickerson I and Dickerson II deeds of trust. After filing for
bankruptcy, Gooch sold the properties to Landin, who financed the
purchase through People's Choice Home Loan with two notes and deeds
of trust: a $341,600 first lien deed of trust (Landin I) and $85,400 second
lien deed of trust (Landin II). The Landin I deed of trust provided for
subrogation to all superior liens paid off by proceeds from the Landin I
note. The holder of the Dickerson I note and deed of trust received a
check in full payment of the Dickerson I note for $348,000 and signed a
release of the Dickerson I deed of trust. The Dickerson II note was not
paid off. Upon foreclosure of the Landin I deed of trust, the mortgagee,
HSBC Bank, acquired the property for $361,000. After this foreclosure,
the Dickerson II deed of trust was assigned to Real Time Resolutions
(RTR). The Dickerson II deed of trust was posted for foreclosure. Chase
Homes filed suit to prevent the foreclosure on the Dickerson II deed of
trust. Chase Homes claimed that the Landin I deed of trust was subro-
2. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 557.002(a) (West 2009).
3. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 557.003 (West 2009).
4. 309 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
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gated to the Dickerson I deed of trust; however, RTR claimed that subro-
gation would be inequitable. The trial court concluded that the
Dickerson II deed of trust had priority over the Landin I deed of trust
"on the principle that a junior lienholder should not be granted subroga-
tion to the superior or equal equities of others with recorded interests
would be prejudiced thereby."'5 The appellate court reviewed a number
of cases dealing with the equities of subrogation.
In Texas Commerce Bank National Assoc. v. Liberty Bank,6 a property
subject to a first, second and third lien was sold with purchase money
financing from Liberty Bank. Liberty Bank's loan was secured by a deed
of trust containing subrogation language. The proceeds were used to pay
off the balances of the first and second lien notes and deeds of trust, and
the holders of the first and second lien deeds of trust released their liens.
Shortly after the Liberty Bank loan, Texas Commerce Bank, the holder of
the third lien, foreclosed its lien on the property. After default by the
new purchaser, Liberty Bank foreclosed on its lien. Texas Commerce
Bank alleged prejudice because Liberty Bank had not discharged Texas
Commerce Bank's lien. However, the court concluded that "[n]either ac-
tual nor constructive knowledge of an intervening lien would defeat the
rights of subrogation if the senior lien were discharged under an express
agreement," and the release of lien by the prior lienholder, rather than an
assignment of lien, would not prejudice Liberty Bank's right of
subrogation.7
The court also considered the claim that the foreclosure bid price of
$361,000 exceeded the $348,000 Dickerson I balance. Since the Texas Fi-
nance Code allows a subrogated party to accrue interest at six percent per
annum, and the foreclosure bid was less than the principal amount plus
interest at the statutory rate, then subrogation for the full amount of the
foreclosure bid was valid.8 RTR further argued that the subrogation, if
appropriate, should have been limited only to the original principal
amount and not the interest amount. The court concluded that interest at
the statutory rate would also have priority over the existing subordinate
lien.
5. Id. at 624. The trial court's refusal to enforce subrogation against the Dickerson II
note and lien were based on six factors. First, the variable interest rate on the Landin I
note would cause over $100,000 in additional interest, representing a material prejudice.
Second, the release of the original mortgagor and the replacement and assumption by a
subsequent borrower who was not properly qualified as a suitable borrower, as well as high
initial fees and high increasing variable rates would be a material prejudice. Third, the
subrogated note was $41,000 greater in principal than the original Dickerson I note.
Fourth, the financial status of the debtor under the Landin I note increased the likelihood
of foreclosure and the additional costs and expenses attendant thereto. Fifth, the subroga-
tion with a higher principal amount effectively converted accrued but unpaid interest into
principal, increasing the burden on the property. Finally, a prudent second lienholder
would not voluntarily subordinate its position to a loan with the characteristics of the
Landin I loan.
6. 540 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
7. Chase Home, 309 S.W.3d at 628 (citing Province Inst. for Savings v. Sims, 441
S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. 1969)).
8. Id. at 629 (citing TEx. FIN. CODE ANN. § 302.002 (Vernon 2006)).
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RTR raised a "loss of protection" argument, which the court dis-
missed.9 In the Fleetwood cases, Fleetwood held a first lien deed of trust
and a subordinate leasehold interest in real property. A subsequent
lender advancing funds was subrogated to the first lien deed of trust in
Fleetwood I, based upon a loss of protection theory. However, the Texas
Commerce Bank court looked at Fleetwood II, and concluded that the
Fleetwood loss of protection argument was not a legal or vested right and
was abandoned in Fleetwood 1.10 Further, no other Texas cases have
adopted a loss of protection theory of prejudice in a subrogation analysis.
Next, RTR asserted that subrogation arises from equity and thus re-
quires a trial court to weigh the equities. The court discussed the three
types of subrogation: a purely contractual subrogation where there is a
contract between all parties to the subrogation dispute; an equitable sub-
rogation where there is no language in any instrument speaking to subro-
gation; and a hybrid category where there is contractual subrogation
language in a document not with the mortgagee disputing the subrogation
claim." Even in the hybrid category, where "the analysis does involve
equitable considerations, each case is not controlled by its own facts and
the subsequent lender can be entitled to subrogation as a matter of
law."1 2 Therefore, the subrogated lender's actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the existing lien would not defeat subrogation. Consequently, the
court concluded that RTR would not be prejudiced by subrogation in
favor of Chase Homes.
RTR also challenged Chase Homes' proof of entitlement to subroga-
tion, and the court addressed the necessary proof.13 The court deter-
mined such evidence conclusively proved the proceeds from the Landin I
note were used to pay off the Dickerson I note, notwithstanding that the
release was executed nearly one year after the closing. 14
This case should effectively shut the door to future loss of protection
claims, even in equitable subrogation cases. Further, this case provides
the factual evidence needed to prove the payoff of a prior lien. 15
9. See Fleetwood v. Med. Ctr. Bank, 786 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ
denied) (Fleetwood I); and on appeal a second time in Med. Ctr. Bank v. Fleetwood, 854
S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied) (Fleetwood II).
10. Chase Home, 309 S.W.3d at 630-31.
11. Id. at 631.
12. Id. at 631 (citing Providence Inst. for Sav. v. Sims, 441 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1969).
13. Id. at 633. The uncontroverted evidence of the payoff of the prior loan included: a
payoff demand prepared by lender's attorney reflecting a loan number related to the prior
lien paid off; the closing statement reflected the title company's file number relating to the
property acquisition and payoff, and reflected the payoff amounts from the payoff letter;
title company checks in the amounts required in the payoff letter, containing the file num-
ber of the title company; correspondence transmitting the checks which reference the same
loan number as in the payoff letter; negotiation of the payoff checks on or about the date
of closing; the title company's letter transmitting a release of lien which referenced the title
company file number and the loan number; and an executed release of lien referencing the
loan number.
14. Id.





While there were many more cases in this area this year than in previ-
ous years, only two cases are truly noteworthy.
The first case presents a matter of first impression under The Texas
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA).16 In Corpus v. Arriaga,17
Modesto and Felicita Arriaga purchased properties from Wessendorff.
The Arriagas contracted with Corpus for the construction of a dancehall
on one of the properties; however, construction of the dancehall ceased,
and Corpus sued the Arriagas. Several months later, the Arriagas filed
for bankruptcy, staying the lawsuit. In 2002, the Arriagas sold one of the
properties and extinguished the debt and lien on that property. In 2003,
the Arriaga's bankruptcy was voluntarily dismissed, and the lawsuit was
litigated to a judgment in favor of Corpus. Fifteen days after the final
judgment in the lawsuit, the Arriagas transferred the remaining proper-
ties to their children Pete and Delao Arriaga. Corpus claims that the
property transferred to Pete and Delao was fraudulent under TUFTA.
At trial, evidence was introduced that the senior Arriagas had entered
into an oral agreement at the time the properties were purchased and
that the properties belonged jointly to the Arriagas and their two children
Pete and Delao. Testimony reflected that Pete and Delao had made
monthly payments on the Wessendorff note from 1994 through 2002,
when the note was paid off. The trial court found that an agreement ex-
isted among the family members which was entered into before any judg-
ment or claim that Corpus could have made in the case. Corpus
countered that an oral agreement between the Arriaga family members
did not constitute a transfer and that the actual transfer occurred when
the deeds were recorded. On appeal, the court reviewed TUFKFA Section
24.007.18 The court found that no Texas court had interpreted this sec-
tion, but relied on other jurisdictions' holdings that a transfer is made
when a deed is recorded and concluded that Texas law would support a
similar interpretation. 19 In support, the court held that TUFTA was simi-
lar to Texas recording statutes,20 requiring that a deed be recorded to cut
off rights of a subsequent purchaser for value without notice. Therefore,
the court held that the verbal agreement between the Arriaga family
members was not a transfer, but that, for purposes of TUFTA, the trans-
fer occurred when the deed was recorded. 21
16. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001-.013 (West 2009) [hereinafter TUFTA].
17. Corpus v. Arriaga, 294 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
18. Id. at 634-35 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.007(1)(A) (West 2002)
("[A] transfer is made ... with respect to... real property ... when the transfer is so far
perfected that a good faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable
law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is
superior to the interest of the transferee")).
19. Id. at 635.
20. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (West 1984)).
21. Id. at 636.
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The court also considered whether reasonably equivalent value was ex-
changed at the time of the transfer.22 Delao contributed a total of $8,580
toward the mortgage debt, but the property had an appraised value of
$16,060 when it was transferred. Pete paid the mortgage, property im-
provements and property taxes totaling $37,000, compared to the
$109,000 appraisal value for his property. Therefore, the court concluded
Pete and Delao did not give reasonably equivalent value for the property
at the time of its transfer.
The decision as to equivalent value seems questionable. Apparently
there was no evidence concerning the time value of money, and the ap-
pellate court did not discuss that concept. Nevertheless, this author be-
lieves that holding a current period value as being equivalent to a series
of payments over an eight year period starting fourteen years prior over-
looks a fundamental aspect of financial investment analysis.
B. ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
The most important case during this review period deals with the abso-
lute or collateral assignment of rents, which has been the subject of nu-
merous cases and commentaries over the last twenty years. In re
Amaravathi Limited Partnership2 3 is a bankruptcy case in which
Amaravathi owned four upscale apartment properties. The properties
were insured and in excellent physical condition with stable occupancy
and generated a positive cash flow before debt service. The issue was
whether the rents from such properties were assets of the bankruptcy es-
tate; the court concluded that they were.24 These properties were fi-
nanced and secured by a note, deed of trust, assignment of rents, and a
cash management agreement, all of which were securitized and placed
into a securitization pool. Pursuant to the loan documentation,
Amaravathi collected the rent and deposited it into a lockbox under the
cash management agreement. The servicer deducted the debt service
from the lockbox deposits and funded the remainder to the debtor.
When the net cash flow was insufficient for proper maintenance and op-
eration of the property and payment of debt service, Amaravathi stopped
depositing rents into the lockbox, in breach of the loan documents. A
receiver was obtained, but Amaravathi filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy pe-
tition. Amaravathi, in a cash collateral motion, requested use of the
rents; the creditor opposed, alleging that the assignment of rents was ab-
solute under Texas law and that the debtor had no further interest in the
rents. The issue considered by the court was whether the rents were cash
collateral that could be used under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.25
Property rights in post-petition rents are determined by applicable state
22. Id., (citing Mladenka v. Mladenka, 130 S.W.3d 397, 407 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)).
23. In re Amaravathi Ltd. P'ship, 416 B.R. 618 (S.D. Tex., Houston Div. 2009).
24. Id. at 622.
25. Id. at 624 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006)).
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law under Butner v. United States;26 however, the Supreme Court in
Butner determined that federal bankruptcy law would override state law,
if Congress enacted a statute defining the rights to post-petition rents.2 7
The court in Amaravathi concluded that neither the Fifth Circuit nor the
Supreme Court had directly addressed the Bankruptcy Code's treatment
of post-petition rents, that Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(6)28 was unambigu-
ous, and that rents from these apartments came from property of the es-
tate and that such rents were property of the estate. 29
The creditor presented two cases which the court distinguished. In Ja-
son Realty, L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 30 a case decided under New
Jersey law, the court determined that Texas law was different than New
Jersey law regarding title under absolute assignments of rents. Further-
more, the Jason Realty case did not address Bankruptcy Code
§ 541(a)(6). The other case, Sovereign Bank v. Schwab,31 did not address
the effect of Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(6) upon post-petition rents, even
though it determined that post-petition rents were property of the bank-
ruptcy estate. In contrast to these Third Circuit cases, the court noted
Second and Seventh Circuit decisions supporting post-petition rents be-
ing property of the bankruptcy estate.32 Each of these cases specifically
addressed Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(6) and found that the rent from the
property was the property of the bankruptcy estate.
The remaining question was whether legal and equitable interest in fu-
ture rents were held by the debtors or the creditor, which must be de-
cided under Texas law. The two leading cases for assignment of rents in
Texas are Taylor v. Brennan33 and In re International Properties, Ltd.34
In Taylor, an apartment owner used rents that were collected after a de-
fault. In that decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that in a collateral
assignment of rents, the lender must take some affirmative action to acti-
vate its rights to the rents, including obtaining possession of the property,
impounding the rents, securing the appointment of a receiver, or other
similar action.35 In explaining the difference between a collateral and ab-
solute assignment of rents, the Texas Supreme Court noted that, "an ab-
solute assignment operates to transfer the rights to rentals automatically
upon the happening of a specified condition, such as default. '36 In Inter-
26. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
27. Id. at 54.
28. Amaravathi, 416 B.R. at 623. This provision reads, in relevant part, as follows:
"Such estate is comprised of all of the following property..." (6) proceeds, product, off-
spring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate..." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6)(2006).
29. Amaravathi, 416 B.R. at 623.
30. See Jason Realty, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 59 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 1995).
31. See Sovereign Bank v. Schwab, 414 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2005).
32. See In re Vienna Park Props., 976 F.2d 106, 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Wheaton
Oaks Office Partners Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1234, 1240 (7th Cir. 1994).
33. See generally Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981).
34. See generally In re Int'l Props. Ltd., 929 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1991).
35. 621 S.W.2d at 595.




national Properties, the court addressed whether the assignment of rents
was absolute or collateral and determined that the mortgage documents
demonstrated an intent to create an absolute assignment. Based on that
conclusion, the International Properties court determined "that the mort-
gagee should have the right to rents immediately upon default. ' 37 The
International Properties court determined that the absolute assignment
terminology is essentially a legal fiction, since both collateral and abso-
lute assignment of rents are employed to secure a debt.38 Therefore, the
Amaravathi court concluded that "Taylor's statement ... that an 'abso-
lute' assignment of rent passes title to the rents to the lender" was dicta
and was both not binding and not accurate. 39 In other words, Taylor did
not elaborate on whether legal title, equitable title, or both passed to the
lender in connection with an absolute assignment of rents. International
Properties determined that an absolute assignment of rents was a transfer
of legal title to rents, but not an equitable right, until the occurrence of
specified conditions. 40 Both Taylor and International Properties, al-
though decided under Texas law, were decided outside the context of an
existing bankruptcy case. However, the issue before the Amaravathi
court involved an existing bankruptcy case and application of Bankruptcy
Code § 541(a)(6). Because neither Taylor nor International Properties
were decided under bankruptcy law, this court looked to United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc.41
In this case, the IRS seized property to satisfy a tax lien, but Whiting
Pools filed Chapter 11 the next day; whereupon, the IRS sought relief
from the bankruptcy automatic stay, and Whiting counterclaimed for a
turnover order. The United States Supreme Court held that the reorgani-
zation estate included the property of the debtor that had been seized by
a creditor prior to the filing of a petition for reorganization, finding that
Bankruptcy Code § 542(a) is one of several provisions which brings into
the estate "property in which the debtor did not have a possessory inter-
est at the time the bankruptcy proceeding commenced. '42 The Supreme
Court clarified this to mean that if a tax levy or seizure operates to trans-
fer ownership of the property seized, then Bankruptcy Code § 542(a) may
not apply. Ownership of seized property is transferred to a bona fide
purchaser only at a tax sale; until then the title to the property remains
with the debtor.43 Therefore, the Amaravathi court concluded that the
post-petition rents at issue were the property of the bankruptcy estate,
with the key difference between this case and International Properties be-
ing the bankruptcy context. The Amaravathi court specifically stated that
outside of bankruptcy, a lender with an absolute assignment of rents
37. 929 F.2d at 1038.
38. Id. at 1035.
39. In re Amaravathi Ltd. P'ship, 416 B.R. 618, 631.
40. 929 F.2d at 1036.
41. See generally United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
42. Id. at 205.
43. Id. at 211.
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would, upon the happening of the specified event or condition, be imme-
diately vested with rights to the absolutely assigned rents. Since
Amaravathi held an equitable interest in the rents at the time of the
bankruptcy filing, such equitable title to future rents would be part of the
bankruptcy estate despite the absolute assignment of rents in favor of the
creditor.44
This case should have a profound effect on issues of assignment of
rents litigated in the bankruptcy context, since it is irrelevant how artful
an assignment of rents provision is drafted to be absolute rather than
collateral. Nevertheless, this case does not mitigate against proper draft-
ing for absolute assignment of rents outside the bankruptcy context.
Although subsequent to the survey period, the Texas Legislature en-
acted the Texas Assignment of Rents Act (TARA).45 TARA, which be-
came effective June 17, 2011 for deeds of trust and similar security
instruments executed thereafter, provides a statutory framework for the
creation, perfection and enforcement of assignment of rents which will
override existing case law regardless of whether documented or classified
as collateral assignment or absolute assignment. A complete analysis of
TARA is beyond the scope of this article, but the following paragraphs
provide a summary of the salient provisions of TARA.
TARA applies broadly to any security instrument containing an assign-
ment of rents or a security interest or lien in commercial real property,
and defines rents as the consideration payable in exchange for the right of
possession or occupancy of real property.46 The recording of such secur-
ity instrument constitutes perfection of the security interest in rents.47
After a default under the security instrument, enforcement of the assign-
ment of rents is accomplished by either notice to the assignor, notice to
the tenants of the property or by other means sufficient under Texas law
to enforce such assignment. 48 A statutory form of notice is specified in
TARA, which should be used to initiate the enforcement of the assign-
ment of rents.49 Priority of assignments of rents typically follows existing
44. 416 B.R. at 634-36. The court discussed at some length why absolute assignment
of rents do not grant full title to the mortgagee, and that the debtor retains an equitable
title and interest in the rents. The four factors included: (1) the right of the debtor to
require application of rents to the debt or operating expenses of the property, or a right of
accounting, and the contractual limitation on the creditor's rights to use of the rents; (2)
the right of the borrower to use rents in excess of operating expenses and debt service; (3)
the connection between the absolute assignment of rents and a related mortgage debt,
which indicates there was not a true sale of rents (the court determined that the lockbox
arrangement did not constitute a transfer of ownership or a true assignment of the rents)
and that the risk of non-payment of rents resided with the debtor not the lender; and (4)
that the absolute assignment of rents terminated upon payment of the debt.
45. TEX. S. B. 889, 82nd Leg. (2011) (to be codified at TEX. PROP. COD, Ch. 64).
TARA was modeled on the Uniform Assignment of Rents Act with necessary changes for
Texas Law. UNIF. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS Acr (2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/maripp/2005Final.pdf.
46. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 64.001 (West 2011).
47. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 64.052 (West 2011).
48. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 64.053 (West 2011).
49. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 64.056 (West 2011).
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law relating to lien priorities. Significantly, TARA provides that such en-
forcement does not make the assignee a mortgagee in possession or agent
of the assignor, does not constitute an election of remedies or make the
secured obligations unenforceable, limit other available rights of the as-
signee, or bar a deficiency judgment,50 each of which were unclear under
existing common law. TARA also addresses the application of the rents
collected. 51
TARA will require immediate action in revising commercial property
documents such as deeds of trust, lease agreements and subordination,
non-disturbance and attornment agreements. Practitioners representing
mortgage lenders, mortgage borrowers and tenants will need to make
those adjustments in light of the new statutory framework for the crea-
tion, perfection and enforcement of assignments of rents.
IV. GUARANTIES/INDEMNITIES
In current commercial mortgage lending practice, most guaranties, and
almost all guaranties in the securitization context, contain limited guaran-
ties with recourse liability only for what are commonly known as "bad
boy carve-outs." These carve-out provisions are discussed in Fath v.
CSFB 1999-Cl Rockhaven Place L.P.52 In connection with the financ-
ing of various apartment complexes, Fath executed a guarantee which
provided recourse liability for fraud and gross negligence amounting to
physical waste of the property. The subject properties were Forest Cove
I, Forest Cove II and Forest Cove III, and the facts relate to the condition
and affairs relating to Forest Cove III. Fath spent $1,600,000 on exterior
and interior renovations. As market conditions deteriorated, Fath slowed
down and then stopped the renovations at Forest Cove III. Monthly
mortgage payments were later stopped and the loan was declared in de-
fault. At foreclosure sale, Rockhaven bid $1,650,000 and later sued Fath
for breach of the guaranty. Fath appealed the judgment in favor of
Rockhaven.
A. FRAUD RECOURSE CARVE-OUT
Rockhaven had asserted that Fath committed fraud by not completing
and paying for the renovations for Forest Cove III, thereby triggering the
recourse liability. Fraud occurs only when a promise to do an act in the
future is made with no intention of performing the promise at the time
the promise was made. Fath intended to complete the renovations at the
time the loan was obtained. Testimony proved the 2004 budget did not
include interior renovation funds because of the deteriorating market
conditions. Furthermore, Fath had made mortgage payments for over
three years, had followed a plan of renovation for Forest Cove I, Forest
50. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 64.057 (West 2011).
51. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 64.058 (West 2011).
52. See generally Fath v. CSFB 1999-Cl Rockhaven Place Ltd. P'ship., 303 S.W. 3d 1
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet denied).
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Cove II and Forest Cove III in that order, and had spent over of
$4,000,000 on mortgage payments and renovations. Also, the loan docu-
ments did not contain a deadline for renovations. All of these facts led
the court to conclude that there was insufficient evidence to show fraud
at the time the property was acquired and loan obtained.
B. WASTE RECOURSE CARVE-OUT
Waste. Next the court addressed whether gross negligence or willful
misconduct led to physical waste. Evidence supported the claims of gross
negligence. 53 Several witnesses had testified that Fath's approach to the
renovation (basically the removal of all tenants and the renovation of the
property at one time, rather than renovating each building in a sequential
manner) deviated from industry standards because it eliminated all cash
flow from the property. These witnesses included a contractor, a real es-
tate appraiser, and an employee of the creditor. Fath's contention that
renovation of the entirety was necessary due to crime was not viewed as
compelling. Having satisfied the gross negligence element, the court
looked to the physical waste element. 54 The loan documents allowed ren-
ovation of the complex, but did not permit demolition of the interior of
the project in preparation of renovations and then abandonment of such
work. At the time of the default, many of the apartment units were noth-
ing more than a shell, and evidence reflected that it would cost more than
$3,000,000 to repair the damage caused by such renovation efforts. Con-
sequently, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support a
claim of physical waste.
This case should be helpful to practitioners since most recent guaran-
ties contain non-recourse carve-outs, which typically cover fraud and
waste, as well as a host of other sins. It may also be instructional in pre-
paring documents for a renovation loan.
V. PURCHASER/SELLER
A. RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL
Two cases deal with rights of first refusal. FWT, Inc. v. Haskin Wallace
Mason Property Management, L.L.P.,55 addresses whether the holder of a
preferential right can be required to purchase assets that are bundled
with the property subject to the preferential right. Haskin Wallace
formed Texas Galvanizing, operating a hot dip galvanizing plant. FWT
sold Haskin Wallace six acres of undeveloped property located adjacent
53. The elements for gross negligence are: (1) "viewed objectively from the actors
standpoint, the act or admission complained of must depart from the ordinary standard of
care to such an extent that it creates an extreme degree of risk of harming others;" and (2)
"the actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved and chose to proceed
in conscious indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of others." Id. at 6.
54. A claim of waste "must show an injury to the reversionary interest in land caused
by the wrongful act of a tenant or other party rightfully in possession." Id. at 7.
55. 301 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2009, pet. denied).
[Vol. 64
Real Property
to FWT's plant. The deed contained a right of first refusal, providing
"Grantor shall... elect to purchase, lease or otherwise accept such con-
veyance ... at the same price and under the same terms and conditions
offered by the prospective purchaser." Haskin Wallace then created U.S.
Galvanizing to operate a galvanizing business on the property subject to
the preferential right and commenced operations. Eventually, Haskin
Wallace decided to sell both Texas Galvanizing and U.S. Galvanizing.
FWT made an offer to purchase both businesses for $15,500,000, but Has-
kin Wallace contracted with Valmont Industries to sell both galvanizing
businesses for $16,500,000, to lease the subject property for $25,000 per
month for five years with two five year extensions, with an option to
purchase the property for $2,500,000, and to sublease from Haskin Wal-
lace the property on which Texas Galvanizing was located. In response,
FWT sent a letter electing to exercise its right of first refusal as to the
subject property only, without agreeing to the other terms in the agree-
ment between Valmont and Haskin Wallace. Haskin Wallace advised
FWT that FWT must accept all of the terms of the offer from Valmont, or
the offer under the right of first refusal would be considered rejected.
Ultimately, Haskin Wallace sued FWT for a declaratory judgment that
the right of first refusal had been extinguished. FWT responded that the
right of first refusal pertained only to the subject property and that FWT
could lease the subject property and have the purchase option for the
property. The court concluded that the terms of the option created by
the right of first refusal are formed by the provisions of preferential right
and the terms and conditions of the third party offer.56
The court addressed and distinguished each of the five Texas cases re-
lied upon by FWT. In Hinds v. Madison,57 there was no evidence that the
lessor would sell the lesser-included tract alone without selling the whole.
The court determined that the preferential right cannot be enlarged to
cover other lands owned by the lessor; the right covers nothing except the
property actually subject to the option. This holding supported FWT's
position that the holder of a preferential right cannot be compelled to
purchase assets beyond the scope of the preferential right in order to ex-
ercise that right.5 8
In Riley v. Campeau Homes (Tex.), Inc.,59 the court held that the pref-
56. Id. at 793 (citing Abraham Inv. Co. v. Payne Ranch, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied)).
57. See generally Hinds v. Madison, 424 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). Madison owned a 14,000 acre tract, of which 2,800 acres was leased to
Hinds pursuant to a lease containing a right to sell the property and a right of first refusal
on the leased premises. Mason entered into a contract with a third party for the sale of the
entire 14,000 acre tract, although such sale was never consummated. Hinds sued to exer-
cise the preferential right, contending it covered the entire 14,000 acre tract for the same
price and terms in the contract between Madison and the third party.
58. FWT, 301 S.W.3d at 795.
59. See generally Riley v. Campeau Homes (Tex.), Inc., 808 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd by agr.). Riley held a lease on a condominium unit
containing a preferential right to purchase the property if the landlord received an offer to
purchase the leased premises in whole or in part. The condominium owner, Campeau,
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erential right was triggered even though the unit was included as part of a
package for the entire condominium project. The Riley holding was
based on the right of first refusal being triggered. The FWT court distin-
guished Riley, since the question of triggering the right was not at issue. 60
In Comeaux v. Suderman,61 the court found that Comeaux received
notice and was given an opportunity to exercise the right of first refusal.
FWT had relied on a footnote in the Comeaux opinion, citing Riley, stat-
ing that the interest of a preemptive right holder cannot be defeated by
selling the subject matter of that right as part of a larger transaction. 62
However, the FWT court distinguished Comeaux, which it characterized
as dealing with the issue of whether the preferential right was triggered.
In McMillan v. Dooley,63 the court discussed Hinds and agreed with its
reasoning, noting: "if a right holder is not permitted to expand his prefer-
ential purchase right to include property not covered by the provision, it
would be improper for him to be required to accept other property not
covered by his preferential right in order to exercise his right."' 64 Never-
theless, the FWT court distinguishes McMillan by characterizing the
package deal as consisting of three unrelated leases, whereas the business
assets and properties presented in FWT are significantly related.65 The
court also distinguished McMillan because there were other preferential
right holders relating to properties included in the package, whereas in
entered into a contract to sell all of the project, including the subject condominium unit.
Riley provided notice to exercise the preferential right, and Campeau countered that it had
no intention to sell individual units other than in connection with a transfer of the entire
project.
60. FWI, 301 S.W.3d at 796.
61. See generally Comeaux v. Sulderman, 93 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, no pet.). This case involved a one acre tract leased by Comeaux from Suder-
man. The lease had a preferential right providing that if Suderman received a purchase
offer, then Comeaux had a preferential right to purchase the property on the same terms
and conditions as those offered by the prospective purchaser. Suderman notified Comeaux
of a pending $350,000 cash offer for the subject leased premises as well as "some adjoining
property," without specifying the total acreage of the adjoining property to be 35 acres.
Comeaux assumed the adjoining property was only 22 acres. Comeaux declined the offer
and continued to make lease payments to the new owner. When a storm destroyed his
fishing pier, Comeaux abandoned the leased premises, but later sued Suderman and the
purchaser under the preferential right. Comeaux argued that his preferential right was
never triggered because the notice failed to offer him the right to purchase only the leased
premises instead of the group of properties, and that the offer did not contain relevant
terms and conditions of the sale.
62. 301 S.W.3d at 797.
63. See generally McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet.
denied). McDonald acquired by assignment three leases containing a preferential right.
McMillan expressed an interest in purchasing one of the three leases, and McDonald stated
he was interested only in selling the three leases as a package. Thereafter, McDonald
conveyed all three leases to McMillan without advising the preferential right holders of the
offer. One preferential right holder, Dooley, informed McMillan of the preferential right
to the subject lease, and McMillan offered to sell all of the leases, not just the one lease, to
Dooley. Dooley declined, and together with the other preferential right holders, sued
McMillan.
64. Id. at 799.
65. 301 S.W.3d at 798.
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FWT, there were no other competing right holders. 66 To this author, this
seems to be faulty logic. As to the distinguishing characteristic of similar-
ity of properties, in McMillan all three properties were oil and gas lease
properties, which is exactly the type of property in which Dooley held a
preferential right. But in FWT, the asset package included operating
businesses. Therefore, the right was converted from covering a property
to covering an operating business. It is illogical to suggest that the inclu-
sion of operating businesses in the offer package is a similar type
property.
In Navasota Resources, L.P. v. First Source Texas, Inc.,67 the court, cit-
ing Hinds, McMillan and Comeaux approvingly, stated that "virtually
every authority of which we are aware agrees that the holder of a prefer-
ential right cannot be compelled to purchase assets beyond those in-
cluded in the scope of the agreement subject to the preferential right in
order to exercise that right."'68 The Navasota court concluded that Nava-
sota could purchase the interest in the Hilltop Prospect without comply-
ing with the other terms of the Chesapeake arrangement. But the FWT
court distinguished Navasota because the additional properties were un-
related to the property subject to the preferential right.69 This newly en-
visioned factor of "relatedness" seems very appropriate to this author,
but how the FWT court can justify it with the "similarity" holding in Mc-
Millan is baffling.
Haskin Wallace relied on the authority of West Texas Transmission,
L.P. v. Enron Corp.,70 where the court determined that the grantor of a
right of first refusal controls the conditions of the right, provided those
conditions are commercially reasonable, imposed in good faith, are not
designed to defeat the preemptive right, and the right holder cannot then
66. Id.
67. See generally Navasota Res., L.P. v. First Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App.-
Waco 2008, pet. denied). Navasota and First Source owned a respective 55 and 45 percent
working interest in the Hilltop Prospect. Their joint operating agreement contained a pref-
erential right in the event any party desired to sell any or all of its interest. The parent
company of First Source, Gastar, signed a letter of intent whereby Chesapeake would
(i) purchase 19.9% of Gastar's stock, (ii) purchase 33.33% of First Source's working inter-
est in the Hilltop Prospect, and (iii) enter into an area of mutual interest comprising 13
counties in East Texas. First Source notified Navasota of the Chesapeake deal and stated it
would be obligated to pay Gastar for the one-third of its leasehold acreage in the Hilltop
Prospect and a percentage of drilling costs, but without requiring Navasota to purchase
Gastar's stock or enter into the multi-county area's interest agreement. Navasota elected
to exercise its preferential right, but First Source sent a second notice requiring Navasota
to comply with every aspect of the Chesapeake deal. Navasota refused to accept that offer
and Gastar and Chesapeake consummated their agreement.
68. Id. at 535.
69. 301 S.W.3d at 799.
70. W. Tex. Transmission, L.P. v. Enron Corp., 907 F.2d 1554, 1557-58 (5th Cir. 1990).
Valero held a preferential right to purchase an interest in a pipeline if Enron decided to
sale its interest. The preferential right provided it was to be on the same terms and condi-
tions set forth in the third party offer. Enron and TECO Pipeline Company negotiated a
deal to sell Enron's interest in such pipeline and all of Enron's stock in Nortex. The agree-
ment was expressly conditioned on the FTC's approval of the sale. Valero chose to exer-
cise its preferential right, but declined to agree to the FTC approval condition. When the
FTC disapproved the sale to Valero, this suit followed.
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remove the specific conditions from the contract or extract other conces-
sions. 71 The FWT court admits that West Texas Transmission involved
only a single asset, instead of multiple assets as in FWT, but nevertheless
finds it applicable because the preferential right holder had to accept the
additional condition of FTC approval; the additional condition in FWT
was acquisition of the other business assets.72 The FWT court's charac-
terization of a contractual condition being the equivalent of the addition
of operating businesses in the offer package appears disingenuous to this
author. The result in West Texas Transmission was that the right holder
could elect to exercise its option on only the property subject to the right
if the condition in the contract was satisfied. 73 In FWT, the result would
require the right holder to purchase not only the property subject to the
right but additional properties and various businesses. 74 This is neither
logical nor fair.
The FWT court analyzed Texas State Optical, Inc. v. Wiggins,75 which
held that the general rule on preferential rights is that the acceptance
must be unequivocal and a purported acceptance containing a new de-
mand is deemed a rejection; however, a condition of a preferential right
could be disputed if it was commercially unreasonable, was included in
bad faith, or was intended to defeat the right of first refusal. 76 Again, it is
unclear to this author how a legitimate challenge to nefarious conditions
justifies the FWT decision.
Finally, the court discussed Shell v. Austin Rehearsal Complex, Inc.,77
concluding that West Texas Transmission and Texas State Optical fol-
lowed Texas law, which has "long recognized that the failure of the op-
tionee to strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the option
contract may be excused when the failure is caused by the conduct of the
71. FWT, 301 S.W.3d. at 800.
72. Id.
73. West Texas Transmission, 907 F.2d at 1562-63.
74. FWT, 301 S.W.2d at 789-90.
75. Tex. State Optical, Inc. v. Wiggins, 882 S.W.2d 8, 9-10 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, no writ). Dr. Kernek purchased a retail store and professional optometry prac-
tice from Texas State Optical (TSO). TSO retained a preferential right to purchase Dr.
Kernek's business if he received an offer to purchase the business. After Dr. Kernek's
death, his wife entered into an agreement with Wiggins to sell the business. TSO exercised
its preferential right, but reserved the right to dispute clauses in the agreement between
Kernek and Wiggins as to commercial reasonability, good faith, and intent to defeat a
preferential right. The disputed clauses gave Wiggins a buyer's commission and a one year
employment contract to certain employees.
76. FWT, 301 S.W.3d at 800.
77. Shell v. Austin Rehearsal Complex, Inc., No. 0397-00411-CB, 1998 WL 476728, at
*1-2 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 13, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Austin
Rehearsal leased space in a building owned by Shell. The lease contained a preferential
right upon an offer to lease other space in the same building and gave Austin Rehearsal the
right to lease such other property. A notice of a new space lease was sent to Austin Re-
hearsal. Shell refused to lease the space after Austin Rehearsal exercised its preferential
right. Shell contended that Austin Rehearsal did not effectively exercise its option because
its acceptance was conditional, reserving the right to have a court determine the legality of
the permitted use and other terms and conditions of the offer.
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optionor. ' 78 In another leap of logic, the FWT court concluded that the
exceptions stated in Texas State Optical were applicable in FWT.79
The FWT court concluded that the general rule in Texas is that "the
holder of a preferential right cannot be compelled to purchase assets be-
yond the scope of the agreement subject to the preferential right in order
to exercise that right," but an exception to the rule exists when the "pref-
erential right is expressly made subject to the same terms and conditions
offered by a prospective, bona-fide third party purchaser."80 In cases
where the terms and conditions of the offer are incorporated in the pref-
erential right, the issue turns on whether the conditions are commercially
reasonably, imposed in good faith, and not designed to defeat the prefer-
ential right.81 These exceptions have only been applied to single asset
scenarios, but the FWT court concluded that there is no reason the excep-
tion should not apply in the multiple assets scenarios. 82 The court pro-
vided no analysis for such conclusion. Since the preferential right
provision in FWT clearly required the exercise of the preferential right to
be on the same terms and conditions offered by the purchaser, FWT
would be required to purchase all of the multiple assets absent one of the
defeating conditions. 83 The court concluded no such conditions existed
and held that FWT was required to acquire the multiple assets contained
in the proposal. 84
This case can and should be questioned for its analysis and effect, and
should not be relied upon for precedential value. In avoiding the Texas
rule that a preferential right holder cannot be compelled to purchase as-
sets beyond the scope of the preferential right in order to exercise that
right,85 the court went to great lengths and used faulty logic to craft new
exception principles to the general rule.86 These problems are presented
in the context of a preferential right property which is sold as part of a
larger group of properties. The FWT court ignores precedential value of
various cases, characterizing them as fundamentally different because
they deal only with the "triggering" aspect of the preferential right. 87
Triggering type cases are those where the preferential right is exercisable
because the subject property is either less than all of the preferential right
property or the preferential right property is included as part of a larger
group of properties.88 How are these cases different from FWT? The
78. FWT, 301 S.W.3d at 801.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 801-02.
82. Id. at 802.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 803.
85. Id. Navasota Resources, L.P. v. First Source Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 535 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2008, pet. denied).
86. FWT, 301 .W.3d at 801.
87. See id. at 796-97.
88. See Comeaux v. Suderman, 93 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, no pet.); Riley v. Campeau Homes, Inc., 808 S.W.2d 184,187 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd by agr.).
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McMillan case hits the nail on the head, indicating that a right holder who
cannot expand his preferential right to additional properties should not
be required to accept additional properties in order to exercise his prefer-
ential right. 89
The FWT court fails to address numerous practical considerations. If a
larger group of property is to be sold, the property owner has knowledge
of the existing preferential right to the lesser included tract and should be
charged with addressing that right in the offer. The offer could be struc-
tured in numerous ways: the preferential right property could be ex-
cluded upon exercise of the right; the preferential right property could be
subject to a separate contract of sale; or the purchase price could be al-
tered based upon the exercise or non-exercise of the preferential right.
The property owner is in a better position to deal with a subsequent pur-
chaser, having granted away the preferential right; the preferential right
holder is disadvantaged if he must acquire more properties than were
included in the preferential right.
This decision should provide practitioners significant guidance on how
to draft preferential rights in order to avoid unintended results. These
might include the inclusion of a covenant not to include more property in
the offer, or a provision that all of the property covered by the preferen-
tial right must be the subject of an offer, such that portions of the prefer-
ential right property cannot be sold without the whole.90 Perhaps,
preferential right covenants can provide for separate pricing of the pref-
erential tract if it is part of a larger or lesser tract of land. Finally, a
covenant not to include operating businesses, as distinguished from either
undeveloped land or land subject to specified types of development
should be included. This last suggestion raises the most outrageous rea-
soning of the FWT court: the characterization of what constitutes similar
or related properties justifying the inclusion of additional properties as a
requirement for the exercise of a preferential right. In this case, the FWT
court concluded that the preferential right property (undeveloped land at
the time of the grant) could be tied with the sale of the ongoing business
of a galvanizing plant, since they were related.91 On the other hand, the
court concluded that three oil and gas leases were of a different nature
and character to avoid tying the larger group of properties with the pref-
erential right property.92 This does not seem rational or logical, and the
court did not attempt to explain its reasoning. On the whole, this author
believes that future courts will take a different position and provide more
sound reasoning in this area; until then, practitioners should be wary.
The second right of first refusal case reviewed is Hicks v. Castille.93
Castille purchased from Hicks 96 acres of a 100 acre tract.94 The remain-
89. McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 179 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. denied).
90. But see Hicks v. Castille, infra at note 70 and accompanying text.
91. FWT, 301 S.W.3d at 802-03.
92. McMillan, 144 S.W.3d at 179.
93. Hicks v. Castille, 313 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2010, pet. denied).
94. Id. at 878.
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ing four acres included a .28 acre tract subject to a tower lease with
American Tower. Castille held a right of first refusal to purchase both
the four acre tract and the American Tower lease. 95 Hicks ultimately sent
a notice to Castille of the intent to sell the .28 acre tract.96 Castille did
not exercise the option and filed for declaratory judgment, asserting the
preferential right required Hicks to sell the four acre tract as a whole.97
In construing this provision, the court looked at the rights and restrictions
of a holder of a right of first refusal. 98 Of particular importance is
whether the holder of a right of first refusal can compel a sale to prevent
a sale or to compel an unwilling owner to convey the property. 99 The
court looked at the doctrine of restraint against alienation, which is "an
inherent and inseparable quality of an estate in fee simple." 1°° A restrain
on alienation is "an attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or con-
tract to cause a later conveyance ... to terminate or subject to termina-
tion all or part of the property interest conveyed." 10 1 The court
concluded that Castille's construction of the right of first refusal would be
the equivalent of an unreasonable restraint on alienation since there
would be a prohibition on selling any portion of the land in question,
other than the entire four acres, for an indeterminable period of time.102
Note that Hicks distinguishes FWT on the basis that in FWT the contem-
plated sales terms went beyond the scope of the right of first refusal,
whereas in Hicks the .28 acres was part of the four acres on which the
right of first refusal existed. 103
The unlimited duration factor was important to Hicks ruling. The court
cites O'Conner v. Thetford1° 4 for the proposition that restrictions on
transfer may be valid if they are of reasonable duration. The court, in an
utilitarian perspective, considered the purposes and restrictions associ-
ated with the right of first refusal and construed the agreement in a way
so as not to invalidate the right of first refusal. 10 5 The ruling illustrates
the dilemma in such an all-or-nothing construction: "either it disallows
Hicks to sell a portion of his property infringing on his ownership ... or it
compels him to sell more [land] than he desire to sell." °10 6 Consequently,
Castille's right of first refusal was triggered upon notice of the sale of the




98. Id. at 880-81.
99. Id. at 881.
100. Id. at 881-82 (citing Potter v. Couch).
101. Navasota Res., L.P. v. First Source Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 537-38 (Tex. App.-
Waco 2008, pet. denied).
102. Id. at 882.
103. 313 S.W.3d at 882, fn. 5.
104. O'Conner v. Thetford, 174 S.W. 680, 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1915, writ
ref'd).
105. Hicks, 313 S.W.3d at 883.
106. Id. at 884.
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lapsed as to that portion of the subject property.10 7
VI. LANDLORD/TENANT
A. TRADE FIXTURES
In C.W. 100 Louis Henna, Ltd. v. El Chico Restaurants of Texas,
L.P.,108 the issue was whether air conditioning units were trade fixtures
or part of the improvements. El Chico, as the tenant, entered into a
ground lease with Henna, the landlord, requiring the tenant to construct a
building on the leased property pursuant to plans and specifications ap-
proved by the landlord. El Chico terminated its operations at the prop-
erty, but continued to pay rent. After the expiration of the lease term,
Henna sued El Chico for failing to maintain and repair certain air condi-
tioning units which had been vandalized by copper theft and damaged by
hail. The court concluded the air conditioning units were trade fixtures
and El Chico was not responsible for their repair, based primarily on the
language in the lease that provided that trade and business fixtures were
not deemed to be part of the premises but remained the property of the
tenant.109 The lease defined "Premises" to be the land and improve-
ments, but not "trade or business fixtures."110 Without providing a spe-
cific definition, the drafters were considered to have intended the well
established definition of same under Texas law. 11 El Chico presented
uncontroverted evidence that the air conditioning units were not attached
to the building and were readily removable. On the other hand, the land-
lord emphasized the inclusion of the specified air conditioning units in the
plans and specifications for the construction of the improvements. The
court held that inclusion of air conditioning units in the plans and specifi-
cations was irrelevant since the plans and specifications also included de-
scriptions of the tenant's walk-in coolers, freezers, tables and chairs, and
other trade fixtures and restaurant equipment.'1 2 Therefore, the exclu-
sion of trade or business fixtures from the definition of improvements,
without further describing what was intended, required the conclusion
that the air conditioning units would be considered trade or business fix-
tures under the definition commonly used." 3 The Henna decision ac-
knowledged that air conditioning units can be either trade fixtures or
improvements depending upon facts and circumstances or the written
contract. 1 4 Consequently, practitioners should take this uncertainty into
107. Id.
108. C.W. 100 Louis Henna, Ltd. v. El Chico Rest. of Tex., L.P., 295 S.W.3d 748, 750
(Tex. App.-Austin 2009, no pet.).
109. Id. at 758.
110. Id. at 754.
111. Id. at 754-55. In general, trade fixtures are personality annexed to realty by the
tenant to enable him to carry on a trade, profession or enterprise.
112. Id. at 757.
113. Id. at 758.
114. Id. at 756.
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account in drafting lease provisions by clearly defining what does and
does not constitute trade fixtures.
B. PURCHASE OPTON
In Moosavideen v. Garrett,n 5 the court faced the issue of whether the
election of a purchase option contained in a lease was invalidated by a
subsequent default under the lease. The tenant, Moosavideen, sent a no-
tice advising the landlord of the intention to exercise the purchase op-
tion.116 The lease gave the lessee the right "at any time within a period of
the term of this lease, to purchase the interest of Lessor in and to the
demised premises .. 117 One of the intervening tenants was Texaco,
which was responsible for certain environmental contamination of the
property. After the purported purchase option election by Moosavideen,
the landlord gave notice of default based on such environmental contami-
nation. In addressing this issue, the court concluded that the tenant was
entitled to exercise the option at any time during the lease term because
compliance with other terms and provisions of the lease was not a condi-
tion precedent to his right to exercise the lease-purchase option.118 The
court considered numerous other case authorities and concluded that the
language of the option would govern what conditions were applicable to a
proper exercise.119 If compliance with other terms and provision of the
lease were not conditions to the exercise of the option, then the election
does not require compliance with the other provisions of the lease.
120
However, in Tidwell v. Lange,12 the purchase option specifically condi-
tioned the purchase option on the lessee not being in default. Since the
parties in Moosavideen failed to specify any such conditions, the court
concluded the purchase option was duly exercised and not impacted by
an alleged default under the lease. 122 This case further exemplifies the
need for careful drafting of instruments, particularly purchase options.
Any conditions to such options must be clearly spelled out in unambigu-
ous terms in the written contract.
VII. CONSTRUCTION MATTERS
Most of the construction-related cases during the Survey period were
uniquely factual or procedural and are not reported here, but a number
did address nuances of construction law practice and are instructive to the
115. Moosavideen v. Garrett, 300 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2008, pet. denied).
116. Id. at 795. The subject lease had been executed many years before, and the cur-
rent landlord was numerous heirs of the original landlord. The case discusses whether
proper notice was given to each of the heirs who were currently landlords, but a discussion
of such point is irrelevant to the subject topic.
117. Id. at 794.
118. Id. at 799.
119. Id. at 799-801.
120. Id. at 799 (citing Cook v. Young and Giblin v. Sudduth).
121. Tidwell v. Lange, 531 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
122. Moosavideen, 300 S.W.3d at 801.
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practitioner. First, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Texas Contract Carpet,
Inc., 23 addressed the Construction Trust Fund Act and the meaning of
"trustee" pursuant to a trust indenture for bond proceeds. The court
found that the plain language of the Act exempts lenders, and further,
that the lender was not a trustee, not an agent of the owner, and not a
fiduciary to a subcontractor.1 2 4 This was in spite of the fact that the
lender controlled the construction account proceeds and retainage. 125
Funds in the construction account were owned and held for the benefit of
the bondholder alone, and subcontractors had no right of ownership or
possession to those funds. 126 Thus, even though the owner arguably con-
tracted away the attributes of an owner, the statute was left lacking in this
regard-a question for the legislature, not the court. 127
Two cases dealt with governmental entities and construction activities.
In City of Carroilton v. RIHR, Inc.,128 the city's refusal to issue a building
permit to the owner unless the owner provided funding for remediation
of a separate retaining wall amounted to an "exaction" in violation of the
Takings Clauses of the Federal and Texas Constitutions. The conduct of
the city was a "compensatory regulatory taking" because the city failed to
demonstrate a legitimate connection between remediation of the col-
lapsed wall and the building permit for completion of residential con-
struction on lots separate from the retaining wall remediation. 129 Also, in
Harris County Flood Control District v. Great American Insurance Co.,130
the governmental entity waived immunity from liability by entering into a
contract. However, the contract did not specifically provide for attorney
fees in the event of conflict, and attorney fees were not recoverable be-
cause governmental immunity was not waived as to that claim.1 3' Moreo-
ver, quantum meruit did not lie because there had been no waiver of
governmental immunity. 132 The dissent pointed out that the claim for
attorney fees was only a remedy and part of a breach of contract
action. 133
In two procedural cases, courts pointed out two lessons for trial coun-
sel. In the first, Okorafor v. Uncle Sam & Associates, Inc.,134 the defen-
dant owner waived the right to arbitration by pursuing an aggressive
123. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Texas Contract Carpet, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 515 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2009, no pet.).
124. Id. at 528, 536.
125. Id. at 536.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 529.
128. City of Carrollton v. RIHR, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010,
pet. filed).
129. Id. at 449-50.
130. Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 309 S.W.3d 614, 616(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).
131. Id. at 618.
132. Id. at 617.
133. Id. at 619.
134. Okorafor v. Uncle Sam & Assoc., Inc., 295 S.W.3d 27, 41 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
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litigation strategy before seeking arbitration. The court found that the
owner had waived the right to arbitration. 135 The owner amended the
pleadings to seek affirmative relief, sent discovery and received re-
sponses, and then moved for arbitration before it had to answer discov-
ery. 136 Also, in Galbraith Engineering Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha,137
the court found that while the party might designate another third party
as a responsible third party for tort and deceptive trade practices actions,
such a right to do so did not act to revive a claim otherwise barred by a
statute of repose. Thus, even though joinder was barred, the responsible
third party provision was separate and applicable. Likewise, even though
the responsible third party procedure was available, it would not revive a
cause of action barred by a statute of repose. The court carefully distin-
guished a statute of limitations, a time bar to asserting a claim, from a
statement of repose, a substantive right to be free from liability after a
predetermined time.
Finally, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Texas, ad-
dressed the issue of notices under mechanic's lien statutes and the auto-
matic stay. In In re Medina,138 a supplier sent a "Notice of Intent To File
Lien" to the owner pursuant to the "trapping" provisions in chapter 53 of
the Texas Property Code. The notice also incorporated a demand for
payment to the owner as permitted by the statute. 139 The owner had also
taken on the role of original contractor and offset payments post-petition
to the subcontractor that had incurred the debt. Apparently, post-peti-
tion, the owner had chosen to continue with the subcontractor in bank-
ruptcy. The court distinguished the trapping notices from a garnishment
or other action against the debtor/subcontractor and found that 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 did not prohibit the demand by the supplier.140 The owner was
motivated to withhold funds to avoid personal liability and to avoid the
filing of the affidavit of lien. 141 Thus, there was direct responsibility and
liability, and the owner was authorized to undertake the offset, which it
did. A supplier's notice of claim and demand for payment pursuant to
Chapter 53 of the Texas Property Code were not actions to recover a
claim against the debtor as such, but were rather actions to recover from
the owner on account of a claim against the debtor. 142 This action had a
clear independent basis and was not stayed by Section 362.143
135. Id.
136. Id. at 40.
137. Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 868-64 (Tex.
2009).
138. In re Medina, 413 B.R. 583, 587 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2004).
139. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.083(a) (West 2007).
140. In re Medina, 413 B.R. at 595-96.
141. Id. at 597.






In Lile v. Smith,144 the court of appeals reversed the trial court, which
had found for the plaintiff in connection with a title dispute pursuant to a
declaratory judgment action. The court noted that "trespass to try title is
the exclusive remedy by which to resolve competing claims to prop-
erty. 1 45 The court also noted that a specific identifiable piece of prop-
erty was in dispute, and this was not just a boundary matter. 146 The court
of appeals was correct, but the confusion over trespass to try title and
declaratory judgment continues.
In Fleming v. Patterson, Land Commissioner of the State of Texas, 147
the court first found that an alleged declaratory judgment action was in
actuality a trespass to try title. Then, the court felt bound to follow Texas
v. Lain,148 which held there was no sovereign immunity available to an
individual official. In order to determine the plea to the jurisdiction, the
court had to consider the title issues.149 Essentially, because the only title
evidence presented at the plea to jurisdiction hearing was by the State,
the State prevailed as to the trespass to try title.150 Two lessons may be
learned-an official does not have sovereign immunity and the decision
on jurisdiction will be based on an evidentiary hearing that may deter-
mine the merits.
Two other cases addressed the factual support necessary in connection
with imposing charges against property. One dealt with imposing a con-
structive trust and the other dealt with the application of the doctrine of
subrogation. In In re Marriage of Harrison,15' a constructive trust could
not be imposed unless the trust fund was clearly traced into other specific
property. An exception lies when the trustee, the wrongdoer, mingles the
trust funds with his own property or invests it in such a manner that the
trust funds can no longer be segregated or identified. 152 However, at a
minimum, in order to impose a constructive trust, the funds which were
the subject of the constructive trust must be traced into the specific prop-
erty sought to be encumbered. 153
In Chase Home Finance, LLC v. CAL Western Reconveyance Corp.,154
the court also addressed the evidence sufficient to prove up subrogation
144. Lile v. Smith, 291 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet.).
145. Id. at 77.
146. Id. at 78.
147. Fleming v. Patterson, 310 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010, pet.
struck).
148. Texas v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579, 586 (Tex. 1961).
149. Id. at 70-71.
150. Id. at 71.
151. In re Marriage of Harrison, 310 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2010, pet.
denied).
152. Id. at 213.
153. Id.
154. Chase Home Fin., LLC v. CAL W. Reconveyance Corp., 309 S.W.3d 619, 632 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
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to a prior lien. The court addressed a theory commonly raised by those
opposed to subrogation, that is, whether actual or constructive knowledge
by a successor would defeat the right to subrogation and whether any
negligence of the successor was relevant to the subrogation analysis. 155
The court followed the strong subrogation law in Texas, noting that the
junior lienholder and its predecessors-in-interest were not prejudiced if
the new lender was granted subrogation. 156 The court also noted the ex-
press deed of trust contractual subrogation provisions, even though the
junior lien holder was not a party.157 In this case, the lender seeking sub-
rogation included documentation showing the payoff of the prior lien, the
closing statement, the lender's disbursement worksheet, a release of the
prior lien, and a demonstration that the proceeds of the lender's note
were used to pay off the prior lien.158 Also, often an issue with subroga-
tion cases, the subrogation amount at the time of the lawsuit was "the
payoff amount plus [the] legal interest thereon from date of the pay-
ment. ' 159 The subrogation amount was not limited to the original princi-
pal amount of the prior debt, nor was it entitled to the interest rate of the
successor debt.160
B. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
In one of the most important cases during the Survey period, Myrad
Properties, Inc. v. LaSalle Bank N.A.,161 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed correction deeds and may have created more questions than an-
swers. In summary, while trying not to be "blind to the equities of this
dispute," the supreme court reached well beyond the foreclosure contro-
versy at hand and held that a correction deed could not be used to add a
second omitted tract intended to be part of a conveyance. 162 At the same
time, in view of the "clear" mutual mistake, rescission of the foreclosure
was warranted.1 63 This left open questions of whether a rescission must
be by judicial action and whether there could have been rescission if a
third-party had purchased the property at foreclosure. The supreme
court did mention disputed and unclear facts as to whether there were
third-party bidders, 164 but ultimately determined that this was not rele-
vant, arguably because the lender was the successful purchaser and a new
sale would permit the potential bidders to rebid. 165 The supreme court
did find that LaSalle made the sole bid at the foreclosure auction-again
raising the question whether a different result would have been obtained
155. Id. at 631.
156. Id. at 6321-32.
157. Id. at 631.
158. Id. at 632.
159. Id. at 633.
160. Id.
161. Myrad Prop., Inc. v. LaSalle Bank N.A., 300 S.W.3d 746,748 (Tex. 2009).
162. Id. at 752-53.
163. Id. at 753.




had there been other bids at the auction. t66
It has long been the law that a correction document could not affect
third-party rights, but the suggestion that two parties to a transaction can-
not correct a legal description to include additional property is new to the
law and common practice. Texas has strong laws protecting bona fide
parties such as purchasers and creditors, and the supreme court's finding
that a correction document would undermine the purpose of record no-
tice, due to a possible relation back doctrine, is arguably misplaced. 167
There would still be a later recorded notice subordinate to a bona fide
party's claims. The supreme court also failed to address the issues of eq-
uitable title which might arise under such circumstances. The supreme
court's holding, in context, is correct but should have been limited to the
foreclosure setting. The supreme court also made the questionable find-
ing that the lender and substitute trustee were parties to the conveyance
and that the borrower was not, but there was no examination of the deed
of trust. 168 Ostensibly, the supporting mutual mistake for the rescission
would not be present if there had been a third-party purchaser. Cer-
tainly, the borrower and third parties are affected when a public sale is
conducted. A judicial rescission might well be the appropriate remedy
when such a mistake is made, 169 but again, it could have been limited to
that setting because of the potential impact on third parties.
However, now the supreme court has broadly proclaimed "[u]sing a
correction deed to convey an additional, separate parcel of land is beyond
the appropriate scope of a correction deed.' 170 Thus, parties will either
need to correct a deed by utilizing court proceedings, or utilize a second
deed to convey the omitted tract, leaving for subsequent litigation the
questions of equitable title and competing claims to the property. Did
the supreme court misunderstand the significance, or limitations thereon,
of record notice in Texas? Certainly the supreme court looked for a re-
sult which would address and correct a potential inequity and windfall to
the borrower. 17' In doing so, the supreme court may have gone well be-
yond the scope, in order to address the potential unjust enrichment to the
borrower.172
At the same time, the Amarillo Court of Appeals in KCCC Properties,
Inc. v. Quality Vending, Inc.,173 followed Myrad and affirmed a trial court
reformation of a deed to convey only tract one instead of the original
tracts one and two. Again, the KCCC Properties case involved a dispute
over transfer of property and a lawsuit between the grantor and
166. Id. at 748.
167. Id. at 750.
168. Id. at 752.
169. Id. at 751.
170. Id. at 750.
171. Id. at 752-53.
172. See id. at 753.
173. KCCC Props., Inc. v. Quality Vending, Inc., 312 S.W.3d 231, 236-37 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2010, pet. denied).
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grantee.174 Note that Myrad would appear to require a grantor and
grantee to file a lawsuit to reform an incorrect deed, even when the par-
ties are in agreement.
The importance of legal descriptions continued to be a theme in other
cases during the Survey period. In Lowell v. Daniel, 75 a deed was void
for lack of a starting point and angles. Reference to extrinsic resources
not referenced in the deed was not permitted.176 However, in Wiggins v.
Cade,'177 the court found that a reference in the deed to the name of the
adjoining owner was sufficient, in that it allowed the individual to use
parol evidence to locate the property. The deed indicated that the prop-
erty began at the "[n]orthwest corner of the tract of 45 acres of land for-
merly owned by Mrs. Kate Crook.' 1 78 By searching the grantor and
grantee indices in the county deed records, one was able to identify the
property survey name and abstract number.179 Then, with that informa-
tion, the land described in the two royalty deeds could be described with
reasonable certainty. 180 The contesting party argued a subtle differ-
ence-that the deed must furnish within itself, or by reference to another
existing writing, the means or data by which the land to be conveyed may
be identified with reasonable certainty.18' The court permitted the use of
parol evidence, to connect data described in the instrument such as the
name of the landowner to establish the sufficiency of the legal
description.1 82
Another drafting lesson arises in the context of Masgas v. Anderson,183
in which the granting clause was broader than the warranty clause. The
assignment, or deed, included an attached "Exhibit A" identifying seven
oil and gas leases, fractional interests, and disputed interests.'8 4 The as-
signment was intended, or so argued by the grantor, to only assign a frac-
tional interest, noted on Exhibit A and to retain title to the "disputed
working interests."' 85 However, the granting clause indicated that the as-
signor "sells, transfers, assigns and conveys ... all of the grantor's right,
title and interest in ... the oil and gas leases described in Exhibit A."'1 86
There was no reference or limitation to just the fractional interests. 87
The warranty did limit the warranty to the fractional interests, but the
174. Id. at 233.
175. Lowell v. Daniel, 293 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet.
denied).
176. Id. at 768. ("Location is an essential element of a deed which cannot be supplied
by extrinsic evidence.").
177. Wiggins v. Cade, 313 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2010, pet. denied).
178. Id. at 471.
179. Id. at 472-473.
180. Id. at 473.
181. Id. 472-73.
182. Id.
183. Masgas v. Anderson, 310 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, pet. denied).






end result was that the grantor assigned all of its interest in the leases
while only warranting the fractional interests.188
A number of courts also tackled the bona fide purchaser doctrine dur-
ing the Survey period. Relevant to the Myrad decision, the Houston
Court of Appeals in Jones v. Smith189 found that a replacement deed was
ineffective when the grantee already had acquired notice of a prior unre-
corded transfer. The trial court was reversed because it had based its
findings on a first-to-record theory, which as the court of appeals noted, is
not the law in Texas. 190 The court also noted questions as to the timing of
consideration, which is also a necessary element of bona fide purchaser
status.191
Similarly, one that takes by reason of a quitclaim cannot achieve bona
fide purchaser status. 192 In Enerlex, Inc. v. Amerada Hess, Inc.,193 the
deed conveyed "all right, title and interest in and to all of the Oil, Gas
and any other classification of valuable substance . . . ." The deed also
provided "[i]t is the intent of Grantor to convey all interest in the said
county whether or not the [said] sections or surveys are specifically de-
scribed herein."'1 94 A standard warranty clause was also included. Be-
cause the deed referenced "all right" as opposed to "my right," the
grantee contended that this was a warranty deed. 195 The court, on the
other hand, found it significant that the deed never warranted or repre-
sented that the grantor actually owned any mineral interest.196 Viewing
the deed in its entirety, the court found that the grantor never undertook
to convey the property or assert that it owned, but rather only conveyed
its right, title, and interest. 97 Thus, this was a quitclaim and the grantee
could not be a bona fide purchaser.
The Eastland Court of Appeals again took on the characterization of
deeds and bona fide purchaser status in Bright v. Johnson,198 but in
reaching its conclusion, arguably relied on an incorrect statement of law.
The author of the Enerlex case, Judge Rick Strange, dissented in the
Bright case. In Bright, a scrivenor's error failed to reserve or retain min-
erals in a warranty deed.199 The grantee acknowledged that he had
agreed that the grantors should keep the minerals and believed that they
had.200 However, the grantee's son intervened, claiming one-half of the
188. Id.
189. Jones v. Smith, 291 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no
pet.).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 555.
192. Enerlex, Inc. v. Amerada Hess, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2009, no pet.).




197. Id. at 355.
198. Bright v. Johnson, 302 S.W.3d 483, 485 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2009, no pet.).
199. Id. at 484-85.
200. Id. at 485.
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minerals. After the grantor filed the lawsuit and a notice of lis pendens,
the grantee and his son executed and caused to be recorded two "cor-
rected" deeds without warranty that conveyed to the son one-half of the
grantee's interest. Of some confusion, the sales contract indicated that
"the property [would be] conveyed subject to the following exceptions,
reservations, conditions and restrictions. (if none, insert 'none').120'
A. Minerals, Royalties, and Timber Interests:
(1) Presently outstanding in third parties: None ["None" was written
in];2 02
(2) To be additionally retained by Seller: "All of Record.20 3
The court found that this was an indication of the intent of the parties
that the grantor was to retain all minerals of record and that the convey-
ance was to be made subject to those matters.20 4 There were third-party
interests previously of record which were not to be retained, but which
should have been an exception to the property conveyed. 20 5 In essence,
the court found that the use of the contractual term retained was not any
different than reserved because the parties to the contract agreed that
there was a mutual mistake.20 6 The court found itself able to disregard
conflicting precedent and reformed the deed to reflect the parties' intent
that the grantor retain any minerals.207
Before the lawsuit and lis pendens were filed, the son of the grantee
had entered into a contract to purchase one-half of his dad's interest. No
deed was given and subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit, the father
(grantor) provided a deed, without warranty, to the son. The son argued
that he was a bona fide purchaser with equitable title much earlier pursu-
ant to the earlier contract. The court decided that the earlier contract
was at best a quitclaim deed because of phraseology in the agreement
indicating that "I am selling" or "I have agreed to sell. °20 8 The court also
made a broad statement that a subsequent purchaser could not be a bona
fide purchaser "if the conveyance is made without warranty. '20 9 In sup-
port thereof, the court cited to quitclaim cases, not the same instrument
at all.210 The court may well have reached the correct decision based
upon consideration and notice issues, but the statement about the lack of
bona fide purchaser status to a grantee pursuant to a deed without war-
ranty is inconsistent with Texas law.
Judge Strange noted the logic of the results but dissented primarily be-
cause the parties failed to ask the court to reform the underlying
201. Id. at 486.
202. Id.
203. Id. (emphasis in the original).
204. Id. at 486-87.
205. Id. at 487.
206. ld. at 487-88.
207. Id. at 491.





purchase agreement. 211 Judge Strange determined that the use of "all of
record" was not the same as "all," and the contract could not be con-
strued to reserve "all" of the minerals. 2 12 Had the grantee's son been a
separate innocent third-party purchaser, the result would have been im-
practical. A bona fide purchaser could not be expected to investigate
contracts, merger clauses, and the intent of the parties.
Finally, in Longoria v. Lasater,213 the court spent much time discussing
"perfect title," "record title," and "equitable interest." Moreover, the
case includes a good discussion of an intended express trust and the im-
plication of a resulting trust when that express trust fails.2 14 The case is
instructive for its discussion of these principles and terms.
C. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS AND
OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
Holly Park Condominium Homeowners Ass'n v. Lowery,2 15 demon-
strates the importance of the review of the underlying documents before
pursuing collection of unpaid dues. In this case, the condominium owner
failed to pay the monthly assessment and the association proceeded to
conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure. The Uniform Act in section 82.113(e)
of the Texas Property Code gives the right to a condominium association
to pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure.2 16 However, in this case, the condo-
minium by-laws provided for judicial foreclosure, and the court found
that to control. 2 17
In another case, Duarte v. Disanti,2 18 the court explicitly stated that
Chapter 82 of the Texas Property Code, regulating condominiums, does
not provide for redemption when a foreclosure results in a sale to a third
party. Such a right of redemption is provided to a homeowner in a prop-
erty owners association by Chapter 209 of the Texas Property Code.219
The court correctly pointed out that such extreme results for condomin-
ium owners also underscores the need for legislation to generally permit
redemption by a condominium owner foreclosed for the nonpayment of
dues or assessments.
Finally, in another case of interest, only for its interpretation of the
commonly used term "pre-fabricated," the Amarillo Court of Appeals in
Letkeman v. Reyes,220 found that the commonly used term pre-fabricated
was intended to ensure that homes would be of all new construction.
211. Id. at 493.
212. Id. at 494.
213. Longoria v. Lasater, 292 S.W.3d 156, 165 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet.
denied).
214. Id. at 166-67.
215. Holly Park Condo. Homeowners Ass'n v. Lowery, 310 S.W.3d 144, 144-46 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2010, pet. denied).
216. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.113(e) (West 2007).
217. Lowery, 310 S.W.3d at 148-49.
218. Duarte v. Disanti, 292 S.W.3d 733, 734-35 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
219. Id. at 734.
220. Letkeman v. Reyes, 299 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.).
[Vol. 64
Real Property
Thus, pre-fabricated precluded moving a previously built home onto the
property.22 ' The home was an older home which had been cut in half
into movable sections for later re-assembly in the subdivision. The pre-
fabrication prohibition included such a home.
22 2
D. HOMESTEAD
In Fairfield Financial Group, Inc. v. Synnott,223 the Austin Court of
Appeals abrogated its prior holdings in Exocet, Inc. v. Cordes224 to follow
Section 41.001(a)-(6) of the Texas Property Code, indicating that a judg-
ment lien, even though properly abstracted, does not attach to the home-
stead. The Exocet court had followed a separate line of authority holding
that a judgment lien did attach, but could not be asserted against home-
stead property so long as the property maintained its homestead charac-
ter.225 In Fairfield Financial, Connie Synnott remained in the home after
Glenn Synnott moved out and filed for divorce. While Glenn and Connie
were husband and wife, Fairfield Financial had obtained a judgment
against Glenn and abstracted it. Fairfield Financial contended that, once
the husband abandoned his homestead interest, the lien attached to his
ownership in the property. Glenn, in the meantime, had transferred his
ownership interest as part of the divorce to his ex-wife, Connie Synnott.
The court found that the property remained at all times protected by
Connie Synnott's undivided homestead interest in the property and that
the judgment lien failed to ever attach.226 Her homestead interest pro-
tected the entire property, and the judgment lien did not attach to any
portion of the property. 227
In 2008, Section 41.001 of the Texas Property Code was amended to
make it clear that judgment liens did not attach to homesteads. 228 This
decision leaves open the question of whether the judgment lien might
attach to any continuing interest the husband might have had in the prop-
erty after abandonment of the homestead position, such as a remainder
interest. In this case, the husband transferred all of his interest to the
wife.
The Eastern District of Texas, United States Bankruptcy Court, issued
an important opinion in September of 2009 dealing with home equity
loans.229 This case discusses the homestead requirements under Section
50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution in great detail and further discusses
curative steps that may be taken.230 While the court's discussion is bene-
221. Id.
222. See id. at 486.
223. Fairfield Fin. Group, Inc. v. Synnatt, 300 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009,
no pet.).
224. Exocet, Inc. v. Cordes, 815 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, rio pet.).
225. See id. at 352.
226. Fairfield Fin. Group, Inc., 300 S.W.3d at 321-22.
227. Id. at 321.
228. See id. at 320; (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b) (West 2008)).
229. In re Chambers, 419 B.R. 652 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009).
230. Id. at 668-69.
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ficial for its great detail, most of it did not create any new precedent. The
case involved a 2004 refinance and expansion of a 1999 home equity loan,
including an expansion of the homestead collateral. A number of the
normal issues, including subrogation, were included, but two very illustra-
tive and important substantive points were made by the court.
First, the borrower raised a number of challenges to the 1999 home
equity loan, but these were raised more than four years after the exten-
sion of the loan.231 The court found that the borrower was barred by the
four-year statute of limitations from bringing those challenges. 232
Second, the borrower contended that the 2004 home equity loan in-
cluded property that was not a homestead. Paragraph 4 of the "Texas
Home Equity Deed of Trust" stated in pertinent part:
This Extension of Credit is secured solely by the Homestead Prop-
erty. Neither Lender nor any other party has required any collateral
other than the Homestead Property to secure this Extension of
Credit.
Any provision contained in this Security Instrument and any other
document between the parties or with any third party.., which gives
Lender a security interest in any personal or real property other than
the Homestead Property, shall not apply to this Extension of
Credit.233
The court found that to the extent that the lien encumbered non-home-
stead property in violation of Section 50(a)(6)(H), that defect was auto-
matically cured by this language in the deed of trust.234 Otherwise, the
case involved a number of judicial admissions by reason of the borrower's
bankruptcy filings and schedules such as a finding that the lender had
timely tendered a cure, including a reclosing of the home equity loan. 235
Of some interest, the court supported the lender's position that it was not
required to change the interest rate in connection with a reclosing and
refinance.236
IX. MISCELLANEOUS
A. NUISANCE AND TRESPASS
In Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Park Warwick, L.P.,237
the court addressed a distinction between trespass and nuisance. Also,
the court separated the question of nuisance into permanent and tempo-
rary.238 In this case, due to the significant rainfall arising in connection
with tropical storm Allison, water flow into the hotel basement traveled
231. Id. at 680.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 677.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 679.
236. Id. at 678-79.
237. Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Park Warwick, L.P., 298 S.W.3d 436,
444, 447 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
238. Id. at 445.
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through a connecting tunnel to the condominium basement (the Warwick
Towers) and caused significant damage. Warwick Towers sought recov-
ery under theories of trespass and nuisance. The court affirmed the sum-
mary judgment on trespass, finding that a trespass to real property
required a showing of unauthorized physical entry onto the plaintiffs'
property by some person or thing.239 Trespass was an intentional tort
involving an intent to commit an act, and the alleged negligence of the
hotel was not sufficient to support a trespass claim.240
However, in the context of nuisance, those claims were dependent
upon the "kind of damage done, rather than [ ] any particular type of
conduct."'241 The hotel argued that a nuisance theory would not lie be-
cause the alleged damage was a discreet flooding incident rather than a
continuing repetitive event. The Houston Court of Appeals referred to
Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Bates242 and noted that a temporary
nuisance claim could arise in appropriate circumstances from a one-time
injury or isolated occurrence. While a temporary nuisance characteriza-
tion would affect the nature of the damages recoverable, accrual, and
even limitations, the single incident of flooding could sustain the tempo-
rary nuisance claim for the damages incurred.2 43
Also of interest, in Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo244 the court is-
sued a permanent injunction against conducting races of motorized vehi-
cles on a nuisance theory. However, once the homeowner plaintiff
moved away, the court found a lack of sufficient occupancy interest and
thus no further entitlement to injunctive relief.245 This, of course, raises a
question as to whether in such situations the court has created a require-
ment that homeowners continue to bring lawsuits in order to maintain
such an injunction in the event that putative plaintiffs no longer live in
the neighborhood.
B. PREMISES LIABILITY
The cases during the Survey period for premises liability do not raise
significant issues of law, but a few do demonstrate how different courts
may treat invitees. Two of the cases were Texas Supreme Court cases and
are discussed herein. In Scott & White Memorial Hospital v. Fair,246 a
hospital visitor slipped on ice while returning to his car in the parking lot.
Mr. Fair was an invitee, but the Fairs argued that ice posed an unreasona-
ble risk of harm, a condition which the hospital had a duty to protect
against. The supreme court found that naturally accumulating ice did not
239. Id. at 447-48.
240. Id. 448.
241. Id. at 444.
242. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 280 (Tex. 2004).
243. Park Warwick, L.P., 298 S.W.3d at 445-46.
244. Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo, 293 S.W.3d 788, 789 (Tex. App.-Waco 2009,
pet. denied).
245. Id. at 791.
246. Scott & White Mem'l Hosp. v. Fair, 310 S.W.3d 411, 411 (Tex. 2010).
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constitute an unreasonable or unnatural dangerous condition.247 How-
ever, in Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith,248 the owners and operators of a
resort had a duty to an invitee to protect a guest at the bar from "immi-
nent assaultive conduct" by fellow patrons. In this case, one group of bar
patrons began a course of conduct including yelling, threatening, cursing,
and shoving; the bar staff continued to serve drinks and did not call secur-
ity. A fight broke out. While naturally occurring ice does not present an
unreasonable risk of harm, apparently name calling and hand gesturing
fraternity members may.249 Justices Hecht, Johnson, and Wainwright
filed dissents, questioning causation and whether the case was really a
premises liability case (negligent activity as opposed to a physical condi-
tion or defect).2 50 Justice Hecht, joined by Justice Johnson, also filed a
dissenting opinion challenging the supreme court's decision as creating an
undefined exception from the general rule that a possessor of land dis-
charges his duty to protect an invitee from a condition that poses an un-
reasonable risk of harm by giving an adequate warning.251 The supreme
court's decision is the ultimate bar fight. The parties could have avoided
the fight. The parties recognized the increasing tension and were aware
of the potential for a fight. The parties willfully and intentionally en-
gaged in the fight. But at that point the parties were obviously no longer
responsible for their own conduct. This is not the case of an innocent
bystander being injured, but rather an individual that joined in the fight
and chose to do so. Thus, the question: at what point does an invitee
become no longer responsible for his or her own knowing conduct?
On an entirely separate aspect of premises liability, in City of Plano v.
Homoky, 252 the court discussed the Texas Recreational Use Statute,
(foundation Section 75.001-.004 of the Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code)
and pointed out that the duty of the city as a premise owner is limited to
that of the duty to a trespasser in a recreational use situation. In this
situation, a golfer tripped over a board in the clubhouse that was placed
to support large potted plants. The boards and planters were clearly visi-
ble, and the employee that placed the board and planters there did not
think the situation created a danger. The employee also considered the
safety of persons using the lobby when making the decision for the ar-
rangement. Thus, the plaintiff failed to raise a fact question as to gross
negligence, the standard required for liability to a trespasser, and the
claim was dismissed on summary judgment.253
247. Id.
248. Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 770 (Tex. 2010).
249. Id. at 764-65.
250. Id. at 785, 787.
251. Id. at 796.
252. City of Plano v. Homoky, 294 S.W.3d 809, 817 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).




In Lathem v. Kruse,254 a suit by a broker in a joint venture, which was
based on a participation interest in profits, was characterized as a suit for
compensation or commission in connection with the sale of property and
governed by the Real Estate Licensing Act (RELA). Thus, once charac-
terized as an action to recover a commission, it had to meet each of the
written requirements of Section 1101.806.255 In this case, there was no
supporting writing because the broker had agreed to keep his commission
"in the deal" and receive a percentage upon the sale of the property.2 56
The broker thus contended that he was a joint venturer, but the court
focused on whether the broker was seeking recovery of compensation
due for the rendition of services governed by RELA without regard to
what form the compensation took.257 Because of a lack of a writing that
met the requirements of RELA, the broker was not able to recover the
claimed commission.258
D. WATER RIGHTS
The only non-procedural reported case involving water rights during
the Survey period was Solomon v. Steitler.259 This was a case involving
diversion of surface water and damage to the property of another.260 The
jury found that the diversion was grossly negligent. Punitive damages
were permitted by reason of a violation of Section 11.086 of the Texas
Water Code.
X. CONCLUSION
Though there were no significant changes in real property law during
the Survey period, there were a number of cases which are instructive and
beneficial to the practitioner. Additionally, there were a number of cases
which the authors have criticized, and may be subject to further analysis
in the future. In summary, the following are the general legal develop-
ments and practical advice which can be taken from these cases:
1). Mortgagees should make prompt assessments and elections with re-
spect to insurance proceeds after a casualty to the collateral property.
2). Fraudulent transfers of real property will be determined at the time
of the deed and not at the time of a contract for conveyance.
3). The ongoing consternation between absolute and collateral assign-
ment of rents has been resolved in the bankruptcy context pursuant to In
re Amaravathi, which provides that all post-petition rents become prop-
254. Lathem v. Kruse, 290 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (citing
TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1101.806(c) (West 2004)).
255. Id. at 925.
256. Id. at 924.
257. Id. at 927.
258. Id.
259. Solomon v. Steitler, 312 S.W.3d 46, 50-51 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.).
260. Id. at 50.
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erty of the estate. This is probably the most significant case development
during the Survey period.
4). The law on right of first refusal has probably been misanalyzed in
FWT, and should be used carefully for precedential purposes; however, it
does provide a detail analysis of leading cases in the multiple asset cate-
gory of right of first refusal cases.
5). The use of correction deeds was addressed in Myrad Properties by
the Texas Supreme Court; however, the supreme court may have created
more questions than answers, and until further clarified, practitioners
should be wary on the process of correcting deeds and must decide
whether a court decision will be required.
6). In the homestead context, Fairfield Financial concluded that a
homestead characterization is not lost as to a divorcing husband's one-
half community interest conveyed to the occupying spouse; however, the
court did not address the characterization and affect on the remainder
interest if still held by a divorcing spouse after the property ceases to
become a homestead of the occupying spouse.
